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Abstract— This paper presents an architecture for secure
3.2-1
service discovery for use in home networks. We give an overview
and rationale of a cluster-based home network architecture that
bridges different, often vendor specific, network technologies.
We show how it integrates security, communication, and service
discovery to achieve a secure and trusted way of deploying
services in a domestic environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents work done in The European Application
Home Alliance (TEAHA) project [1]. TEAHA’s objective is
to develop an open, secure, interoperable, and seamless global
home platform. TEAHA’s approach is to define a suitable
middleware platform that allows the seamless interworking of
a wide variety of appliances found in a home environment.
Industry sees a wide range of business opportunities when the
platform supports legacy services and existing standards next
to new TEAHA compliant services. Examples include UPnP,
Bluetooth, SLP [2], Jini, and Salutation.
Security is a key component in TEAHA’s design. If re-
quired, the entire process from the first discovery of a service
in the network, through the use of that service, to the closing
down of a service can be secured. Security is therefore an
integral part of the architecture.
II. SYSTEM COMPONENTS
In this section we present the principal components of
the TEAHA platform. We start with the articulation of its
main requirements. Seamless interworking of services and
technologies requires:
• The architecture to support heterogeneous technologies.
Standardisation may help to reduce the diversity of tech-
nology but it is insufficient. Moreover legacy technology
must be supported.
• The architecture to support “cluster cultures”. Applica-
tions and services that reside in one cluster share the
interests of a specific value chain. Necessarily, stakehold-
ers of the same application area share the same culture;
they use an accepted terminology, and must cope with
the same set of industrial requirements, standards, and
regulations.
• The architecture to provide a zero-configuration environ-
ment (touch and play). The end users of the TEAHA
platform expect out-of-the-box operation.
This work is sponsored in part by the European Commission (IST-507029
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Fig. 1. TEAHA Transport System
A. Communication
Figure 1 shows the TEAHA transport system. At the bottom,
as an example, four devices (A · · · D) are connected to two
different types of network (IP and EHS). Devices A and B
offer a service according to the UPnP protocol, while Devices
C and D offer a service following the CECED protocol. In
addition, the services of A and C belong to the Lighting
cluster whereas the services of B and D belong to the White
Goods cluster (WG). Clusters represent business alliances
with a predefined application programming interface (API).
In the example, the offered services of each cluster reside on
devices that are connected to different network technologies,
moreover each service uses a different protocol. We therefore
must bridge the technologies (proxy) as well as the respective
protocols (cluster).
The TEAHA middleware offers a rich set of technology
drivers to connect to a wide range of devices. In order to access
the offered services, the middleware provides a set of proxies
that bind a specific protocol to a specific technology. Proxies,
in turn, support a plug-in mechanism to specialise protocol
transformations, i.e., the clusters of Figure 1. The default plug-
in of a proxy is useful for inter protocol communication, e.g.,
between two UPnP services or between two TEAHA services.
Consider as an example Figure 1 once more. Device A
connects to an IP driver. Since the service of Device A follows
the UPnP protocol it will be handled by the UPnP/IP proxy,
moreover the communication can be specialised to follow the
protocol of the Lighting cluster. The service of Device A is
now available as a Lighting/UPnP service, which can be used
by other Lighting services as well as UPnP services. Suppose
we have a Device X (not shown) that connects to the EHS
cluster and its service follows the UPnP protocol then it would
require UPnP/EHS proxy with a default cluster plug in to
connect the service of Device X with the service of Device A.
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Fig. 2. TEAHA Service System
In the diagram of Figure 1 both Device E and Device F
use the default cluster plug in of the TEAHA/ZigBee proxy.
Services of Device E and F are thus connected through the
TEAHA protocol, which allows them to communicate in a
secure way (see hereafter). Note that all proxies are in fact
TEAHA services and therefore security can be guaranteed
between two proxies. The security between the proxy and
the end service depends on applied technology, in case of a
TEAHA/ZigBee network security is again guaranteed.
B. Secure Service Discovery
The concept of service discovery is present in many sys-
tems. Examples are (without being exhaustive) Jini, UPnP,
SLP, FRODO [3] and Salutation. In contrast to most other sys-
tems, TEAHA’s service discovery and security are embedded
in the architecture. The security features rely on the trustwor-
thiness of the proofs of registration and the confidentiality of
cryptographic key material. The security component handles
all security-critical operations. It also stores the identity of the
device in which it is installed.
In order to facilitate the zero-configuration of devices, we
implement a touch and play paradigm. The touch is a physical
registration process, which exchanges credentials among a
gateway and a registering service; for instance by means of
RFID tagging. We use a hierarchy of services as exemplified
in Figure 2. Once registered a service is granted access to all
services down the hierarchy.
Our service discovery process uses distributed directories,
where each directory maps one-on-one to a pool of registered
services. Discovering a service boils down to a query on the
local registry followed with a tree traversal if the requested
service cannot be resolved locally. In our initial design each
directory only stores locally registered services, however if
required for reasons of efficiency a directory could store more
information. This does not change the design.
Our security mechanism relies on a security engine for
storage of device credentials and a cryptographic kernel.
We use a shared key protocol for the authentication and
integrity proof of transferred messages. We chose the station-
to-station protocol [4], which is an authenticated variant of
the well known Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. This
protocol has proven security properties, is simple, and allows
piggybacking with a service discovery protocol.
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Fig. 3. Secure Service Discovery
III. SYSTEM INTEGRATION
As an example of the integration of the security component
and the service discovery mechanism consider the following
scenario. A Service K actively searches for Service M, which
is willing to acknowledge the request provided Service K can
be authenticated (is properly registered). Once accepted they
decide to exchange messages in a secure way. The scenario is
outlined in the diagram of Figure 3.
The steps are as follows: Service K sends a Search request
that includes a so-called Ping message. The Ping entails
the key agreement request of Service K and an authenticity
proof, which allows Service M to verify that Service K posed
the request. Once authenticated, Service M replies with an
Accept message that includes a Pong message. The Pong
entails the key agreement response of Service M and an
authentication proof. After the (authenticated) receipt of the
Pong message Service K and M share a secret session key,
which can be calculated from the exchanged key agreement
information. The session key is used to encrypt data messages
in the further communication among Service K and M.
The architecture, while still under development, reached a
state that makes prototyping expedient. We are developing
a prototype based on commodity technology that includes
seamless interworking, security, and service discovery. The
technology of choice includes an OSGi platform and JXTA
networking. It supports clusters for white goods and lighting,
it supports protocols like UPnP, CECED, and Konnex, and it
supports technologies such as ZigBee, Ethernet and EHS.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an architecture for home
networks that supports secure seamless interworking for het-
erogeneous networks and clusters. One of the main features
is the integration of a flexible transport system, security, and
secure service discovery. The quality of the architecture will
be assessed through prototyping.
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TEAHA Introduction
 TEAHA: The European Application Home Alliance
Sponsored by European Commission 
(IST-507029 priority 2.3.1.8)
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TEAHA Objectives & Requirements
 Objective
 to develop an open, secure, interoperable, and seamless 
global home platform
 Requirements
 support heterogeneous technologies
 despite standardization
 support legacy technologies and existing standards
 Bluetooth, UPnP
 support “cluster cultures”
 technology clusters
 business clusters
 provide a zero-configuration environment (touch and play)
 end users expect out-of-the-box operation
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TEAHA Has Technology Clusters
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TEAHA Has Business Clusters
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Facts about Stakeholders
 Stakeholders in a business cluster
 Share the same culture
 Share the same value chain
 Are competitors
 Would prefer to abstract away from technology clusters
 Stakeholders in different business clusters
 Have different cultures. Do not understand each other
 Have different value chains
 Are not competitors
 Might see added value in cooperating
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Mixing Technical and Business 
Clusters
 Heterogeneous communication
 device tech A/cluster X interworks with device tech B/cluster Y
 Service discovery
 device tech A/cluster X discovers device tech B/cluster Y
 Secure heterogeneous communication
 device tech A/cluster X communicates securely with device tech 
B/cluster Y
 Authenticity: No faked devices when this is a business requirement!
 Confidentiality: No eavesdroppers when this is a business requirement!
 Trusted/Registered devices: No intruders when this is a business requirement!
 Secure service discovery
 device tech A/cluster X discovers in a secure way device tech 
B/cluster Y
 Authenticity, Confidentiality, Trusted/Registered devices
 Policy enforcement: A business cluster can be protected from other clusters
 is a multimedia application allowed to access security system information?
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Device
Services
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Device Architecture for Secure 
Communication
Key Features of a Security Module:
 One SM per device
 Initialized SM ready to be used
 Combination of hardware and 
software
 Hardware Î Non-cloneable
 Software Î Risk for cloning
 Provide true strong 
authentication
 Secure communications rely on 
SM
 Insecure
 Authenticity
 Confidentiality
 Secure = Auth. + Conf
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 Station-to-station protocol (authenticated Diffie-Hellman)
 establish shared key with mutual authentication
 After Ping-Pong D1 and D2 share a common secret
 used to derive encryption and integrity-protection keys to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of subsequent messages
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 Peer-to-Peer or Registry based
 Search Service is followed by Service Acknowledgement
 If service is found it can be used
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 Combine Discovery and Key Agreement
 Combine Security and Communication
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Conclusions
 TEAHA has defined an architecture for secure seamless 
interworking featuring
 Heterogeneous Secure Communication
 Protecting integrity and/or confidentiality
 Strong authentication of the device and services
 Secure Service Discovery
 Key agreement during service discovery
 Secure communication
 Protection against cloning of devices
 Security modules
 Prototype:
 seamless interworking, security, and service discovery
 OSGi platform and JXTA
 clusters for white goods and lighting
 support for protocols like UPnP, CECED, and Konnex
 support for technologies such as ZigBee, Ethernet (IP) and EHS
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